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THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
BUSFARE INCREASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE IRREGULARITIES

The administrative state is upon us and is growing. So it is not
surprising that one of the most rapidly expanding areas of law is
administrative law. Indeed, it has become fashionable to talk of an
'explosion' of administrative-law cases. Something else which is
'explosive' is inflation, especially when coupled with a fuel 'crisis'.
Not unnaturally we tend to get excited when those who run public
transport systems propose to increase the fares, although we must,
of course, appreciate that this is sometimes inevitable. Thus, when
City Tramways Ltd (the 'bus company'), which operated 734 buses
carrying 100 million passengers per year in the Cape Peninsula and
Western Cape, applied to the Local Transportation Board, Cape
Town (the 'Board') for an increase in its tariffs, Mr Roberts became
something of a folk hero when he decided, at considerable expense
to himself, to object. His objection ended in two reported cases:
Roberts v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board and another (1)
1980 (2) SA 472 (C) (Roberts (1)) and Roberts v Chairman, Local Road
TransportationBoard and others (2) 1980 (2) SA 480 (C) (Roberts (2)).
In Roberts (1) Mr Roberts had successfully challenged the Board's
grant to the bus company of its application for a tariff increase. He
was successful on two grounds. In the first place, the Board had
held its hearing too soon after advertisement of the notice of
application in the Government Gazette, as the period for objections
had not expired. The court (Friedman J, Watermeyer AJP
concurring) held that the period of notice was peremptory and
constituted a jurisdictional fact (1980 (2) SA 472 at 476F-477A)
which was justiciable by the court. In the second place, the notice
of application that had been published in the Government Gazette
(twice in fact) did not comply with the statutory. requirement
(s 14(1) of the Road Transportation Act 74 of 1977) that it contain
'full particulars'. This the court held (at 479H) was a peremptory
requirement, and failure to observe it rendered the publication, and
therefore the subsequent hearing, invalid.
With respect, Roberts (1) seems to be unimpeachable. However,
Roberts (2) is particularly problematic and is, I believe, worthy of
comment. I submit that for administrative law it constitutes a small
step forward and quite a few steps backward. In this note I wish to
examine those parts of the case with which I find myself in
respectful disagreement. Finally, in the light of recent legal
developments in this regard in England and Canada, I shall also
consider the one welcome feature of Roberts (2): namely, an
apparent recognition of the duty to act fairly.
I

Roberts (2)
The first decision of the Board having been set aside in Roberts (1),
the bus company proceeded to lodge a fresh application on 31 August
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1979 for an increase in tariffs. However, shortly afterwards the
three members of the Board recused themselves, and on 12 September
the Minister of Transport appointed an ad hoc Board (the 'ad hoc
Board') to consider the application. One of the appointees to the ad
hoc Board recused himself and shortly thereafter another person was
appointed in his place. The ad hoc Board advised objectors
(including Mr Roberts) that they would hear the application on
23 October 1979.
At the commencement of proceedings on 23 October Mr
Roberts's counsel objected to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc Board.
The ad hoc Board ruled that it had jurisdiction, but, at counsel's
request, agreed to a postponement of the hearing so that this ruling
could be tested by way of review proceedings in the Supreme
Court. Before this could be done, the managing director of the bus
company, together with its counsel, went to Pretoria, where they
held interviews with the Chief State Law Adviser and the Secretary
for Transport (as he was then termed) on 24 October (that is, the
day after the ad hoc Board agreed to postpone its hearing). The
same afternoon a meeting of the National Transport Commission
(the 'Commission') was convened to consider a memorandum
placed before it at the request of the Secretary for Transport. The
memorandum requested the Commission to take action in terms of
s 7(2) of the Road Transportation Act. Section 7(2) empowers the
Commission to direct a local road transportation board to refer to
the Commission any application (such as the one made by the bus
company) for the Commission's consideration and decision. Three
of the existing ten members of the Commission attended the
meeting. It was resolved to comply with the request and issue a
directive to the Board in Cape Town. This resolution, together
with the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on 24 October,
were confirmed at the next meeting of the Commission on 26
October. All these events seem to have taken place without the
knowledge of the other parties, including Mr Roberts.
On 25 October the Board received the directive, whereupon its
chairman instructed its secretary to refer the application to the
Commission. This was done on 26 October, and the chairman
notified the other two members of the Board of the directive.
Shortly thereafter the three members of the ad hoc Board resigned.
As a result of these occurrences, the review proceedings concerning
the jurisdiction of the ad hoc Board fell away. Proceedings for the
hearing of the application by the Commission were then set in
motion. But, before the hearing, Mr Roberts decided to challenge
the legality of the sudden turn of events.
Roberts (2) was the result. It was presided over by Friedman J
(who again gave the judgment) and Fagan J (who concurred).
Judgment was delivered exactly one month after the hearing.
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The relief sought by Mr Roberts was comprehensive and a
tribute to his counsel. In view of its complexity, I have not
followed the order in which it was claimed (see the report, 1980 (2)
SA 480 (C) at 484H-485H) but have adopted the following
classification for present purposes. (I shall ignore the particular
remedies claimed.) Mr Roberts sought:
(a) an order setting aside the decision of the Commission to issue
the directive (paras b, e, j and k of the notice of motion);
(b) an order setting aside the referral of the application by the Board
to the Commission in compliance with the directive (paras a
and d of the notice of motion); and, in consequence
(c) an order restraining the Commission from hearing the
application, for lack of jurisdiction (paras f and g of the notice
of motion).
Further incidental relief need not concern us here. In this note I
wish only to consider the judgment of the court in respect of (a)
above. It was the Commission's conduct which was crucial, and the
answers to (b) and (c) largely follow from an answer to (a). With
respect, one can agree with Friedman J's findings only in respect of
(b) and (c) (see the report at 502E-505H).
In order to attack the validity of the decision of the Commission
to issue the directive, Mr Roberts relied on six grounds, namely
that:
(i) the proceedings were sub judice in view of the contemplated
review proceedings, and that it was at least improper for the
bus company to disturb the arrangements by approaching the
Commission;
(ii) the Commission had failed to observe the principle audi
alteram partem in reaching its decision to issue the directive;
(iii) the Commission had failed to observe 'basic fairness' in
reaching its decision;
(iv) the Commission had not been properly constituted for the
purposes of its meeting on 24 October;
(v) the meeting of the Commission had not been held in public;
and
(vi) at the meeting the matter had not been properly considered.
His lordship, in the course of a lengthy judgment, found all these
grounds to be without substance. With respect, it is difficult not to
agree with the learned judge's views on the first, fourth and sixth
grounds. For the first ground to have succeeded, unlawful action
on the part of the Commission would have had to be established; in
other words, contempt of court for breach of the sub judice rule.
However, the learned judge refused to follow an early Transvaal
case, Li Kui Yu v Superintendent of Labourers 1906 TS 181, where
Mason J held that contempt of court could be committed even
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where there was no dolus on the part of the offender. Friedman J
preferred to follow two subsequent cases, Fein and Cohen v Colonial
Government (1906) 23 SC 750 and Yamomoto v Athersuch 1919 WLD
105, which cast doubt on the decision in the Li Kui Yu case and
held that dolus in the form of an intention to defeat the course of
justice was required (see also Clements NO v Banks and Murray 1921
EDL 337 at 343). (See the Roberts (2) report at 486H-488D.)
Certainly there seems to be no reason why the Commission, if it
had had no intention of defeating the ends of justice by obstructing
the contemplated review proceedings regarding jurisdiction, should
not have been free to continue exercising its own statutory powers.
Only where its own powers would have been affected by any
possible order of the court in the review proceedings could it have
intended, or even been legally able, to obstruct those review
proceedings. The fact that its action served to preclude the ad hoc
Board from hearing the matter further did not obstruct Mr
Roberts, but, as Friedman J pointed out (at 488F-H), served to
contribute towards Mr Roberts's very objective in bringing the
review proceedings. Regarding the fourth ground, Friedman J
found that the state of affairs in this particular case, that only three
of the ten members of the Commission had been present on 24
October, was attributable to the fact that, of those who had
received notice of the meeting, some had been unable to attend, one
special member (the Defence representative) did not attend as it was
the practice for him to attend only where the interests of the
Defence Force would possibly be affected, and one (the Railways
representative) was disqualified from attending. The remaining two
members who were entitled to attend had not been summoned, as
they would not have been able to attend at such short notice. Three
constituted a quorum in terms of s 6(4) of the parent Act: the
Transport (Co-ordination) Act 44 of 1948. Relying on English law
and South African cases, his lordship held that only those members
for whom it was physically possible to attend need have been given
notice. (See the report at 497B-501D.) As there was a quorum, the
Commission had to be deemed to have been duly constituted. The
sixth ground of objection was likewise a long shot. Neither Mr
Roberts nor any of the other parties from Cape Town was at the
meeting of the Commission on the 24th. Thus it was pure
guesswork, in the absence of any other evidence, to allege that the
decision of the Commission 'was in fact a dictated decision by the
chairman' and that the other persons present merely 'went through
the motions of a normal decision-making process' (501H). This
may have been the case, but it is one of the features inherent in
administrative law that such allegations are extremely difficult to
prove other than by way of inference. The court had no option but
to accept the denial on affidavit by the acting chairman that this was
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in fact the case and his assertion that due consideration had been
afforded the matter (502B).
However, with respect, Friedman J's disposal of the remaining
three grounds do not seem to me to be quite as convincing; if
anything, the effect is to drag administrative law deeper into a
morass from which courts in other countries have taken years to
extricate themselves. I propose to deal with each ground in turn,
adopting my own numbering.
1 The Commissionfailed to observe the principle audi alteram partem. A
long time ago Schreiner JA issued this warning:
'The classification of discretions and functions under the headings of
"administrative", "quasi-judicial" and "judicial" has been much canvassed in
modern judgments and juristic literature; there appears to be some difference of
opinion, or of linguistic usage, as to the proper basis of classification, and even
some disagreement as to the usefulness of the classification when achieved....
[Olne must be careful not to elevate what may be no more than a convenient
classification into a source of legal rules' (Pretoria North Town Council v Al
Electric Ice-Cream Factory (Pty) Ltd 1953 (3) SA 1 (A) at 11).

Although this warning has been repeated in recent times (for
example in South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice
1967 (1) SA 263 (A) at 277ff; Oberholzer v Padraad van Outjo 1975
(4) SA 870 (A) at 875-6; CarrvJockey Club of South Africa 1976 (2)
SA 717 (W) at 720 and Terblanche v Minister van Vervoer 1977 (3) SA
462 (T)), this classification process has in fact been so elevated and it
has become the bane of our administrative law. (See, for instance,
the discussion in (1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 609-17 and Marinus
Wiechers Administratiefreg (1973) 127ff.) The significance of such a
classification, it seems, is that it is thought to be an infallible test for
determining whether the principles of natural justice apply to the
administrative act in question, and faith in this test is as strong
today as ever. (For some of the most recent cases, see Meyer v
Prokureursorde van Transvaal 1979 (1) SA 849 (T) at 853 and Lek v
Estate Agents' Board 1978 (3) SA 160 (C) at 170-2.) And Roberts (2)
is no exception (see 1980 (2) SA 480 at 489ff). Now this test would
be acceptable if it were used properly, bearing in mind the reasons
for which it was adopted. The 'quasi-judicial' classification was
adopted to describe the sort of administrative decision-making
process to which the principles of natural justice seemed
particularly appropriate (see (1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 609-14). It
concerns the situation where the decision-maker must, before
arriving at a decision, inform himself or itself of the facts or the
facts and the law relating to the particular circumstances at hand.
The principles of natural justice are primarily aimed at facilitating
the accuracy of such information as well as the objectivity of the
assessment of the decision-maker ((1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 635-7).
Thus one way of determining whether a decision is quasi-judicial is
whether it involves 'an inquiry into matters of fact, or of fact and
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law' (Hack v Venterspost Municipality 1950 (1) SA 172 (W) at 190;
Roberts (2) at 489E-H). However, problems arise concerning the
word 'inquiry' (see below). Unfortunately, because of these
problems this method of determining whether the decision is
quasi-judicial is unreliable and leads to abuse of the classification
process. Moreover, the courts have seen fit to impose an additional
requirement, which is often used instead as an alternative test: viz,
whether the act affects 'the rights of, and involve[s] civil
consequences to, individuals' (Hack loc cit). Although this seems to
me to be a purposeless, misleading and superfluous test (see (1979)
96 SALJ 607 at 617-25), it is nevertheless a part of our law (Roberts
(2) at 490G). Friedman J considered the decision of the
Commission to issue the directive from both points of view.
(i) His lordship seems to have searched for formal criteria as
means of answering the question whether the Commission's
exercise of discretion involved an inquiry into matters of fact or of
fact and law. He appears to have been primarily concerned with the
form of the proceedings leading to the decision. This approach, it is
submitted, is just what should not be adopted. It was where the
Donoughmore Report went wrong (see (1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 612;
H W R Wade in (1949) 10 Cambridge LJ 216 at 228), and it defeats
the object of the distinction between 'judicial' and 'quasi-judicial'.
True, our courts have stopped looking for a lisinter partes (see L A
Rose Innes Judicial Review of Administrative Tribunals in South Africa
(1963) 39-41). But they have not got over looking for the other
trappings of a court. Accordingly, 'inquiry' is frequently
interpreted to mean something analogous to a formal hearing. Thus
Friedman J, after surveying the various powers of the Commission
in terms of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act and the Road
Transportation Act (at 491A-493E), concluded as follows:
'In all these instances [including the power of issuing directives under s 7(2) of
the Road Transportation Act] the Commission exercises a discretion which does
not necessarily involve an inquiry into matters of fact or of fact and law,
although they may involve civil consequences to individuals who are affected
thereby. It is, of course, unnecessary for the purposes of the present case to deal
with any of the powers exercised by the Commission except that in terms of
s 7(2) of [the Road Transportation] Act 74 of 1977. When it acts in terms of that
section the Commission is not required, if regard be had to the scheme of the
legislation as a whole, to inquire into matters of fact or of fact and law.
Accordingly, in issuing a direction under that section the Commission does not
exercise a quasi-judicial function; such a decision is purely administrative. When
it comes to consider the application itself, however, the position is entirely
different. The Commission is then holding an inquiry and is required to act in a
quasi-judicial capacity. See City and Suburban Transport (Pty) Ltd v Local Board
Road Transportation,Johannesburg 1932 WLD 100, where Greenberg J, in relation
to a board appointed under the Motor Carrier Transportation Act 39 of 1930 (the
predecessor to Act 74 of 1977), held that, in considering an application for the
renewal of a certificate by a bus company, the board was required to act
judicially. In this regard Greenberg J said the following at 104:
"In Frome United Breweries Co v Bath Justices [1926] AC 586 Viscount Cave LC
(at 591) said of the justices concerned 'they are performing a judicial act, for it
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is their duty after hearing evidence and listening to arguments to pronounce a
decision which may vitally affect the interests of the persons appearing before
them. This being so, the justices who are members of the authority are bound
to act judicially.' (See also at 602, per Lord Atkinson.) I think that the Board
in the present case falls within these definitions or descriptions and is bound to
act judicially."
'In considering an application the Commission must, as it is then acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity, give both third respondent and objectors like applicant an
opportunity of making representations. Indeed, interested persons are entitled to
submit representations. (See s 14(2) of [the Road Transportation] Act 74 of
1977.) And the Commission is obliged to take such representations into consideration. (See s 15(l)(i) of that Act.) See also s 9(1) of [the Road Transportation]
Act 74 of 1977, which deals with the procedure to be followed by the Commission in dealing with any matter before it, and which provides that the Commission may allow interested persons to appear before it and give evidence or make
oral representations' (at 493E-494B).

Surely the word 'inquiry' is not to be elevated to this formal level.
To use it no differently from its normal lay usage (that is, to
connote the process whereby anyone informs himself as to facts or
circumstances) would accord more appropriately with Lord Loreburn LC's description of it as 'a duty lying upon everyone who
decides anything' (Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179 (HL) at
182). Section 3 of the Road Transportation Act, which deals with
the various powers of the Commission, seems to make no special
provision for the Commission when sitting in a 'quasi-judicial
capacity'. Neither does the parent Transport (Co-ordination) Act
make any concession regarding the composition of the Commission
for 'purely administrative' decisions. (The relevant sections are
discussed in the Roberts (2) report at 497D-498E.) Indeed, the Act
goes to great lengths to ensure the impartiality of the Commission
(see, for example, s 3(5)(b) and s 3(8)(a)) and that its membership
will comprise persons of wide experience (s 3(2)). If anything, one
would have thought that a great deal of'inquiring' would be going
on at meetings of the Commission. What better way of ensuring
that the members of the Commission have all the facts at their
fingertips than by allowing interested parties to state their cases?
And the decision to issue a directive would presumably be made
only where the matter seems to be sufficiently important to warrant
the Commission itself hearing the application right away. The
Commission, by not intervening before 24 October, was obviously
not of this opinion until it received the memorandum from the
Secretary for Transport, who acted after hearing one source of
information: the agents of the bus company. If it was necessary that
this information be placed before the Commission, surely the view
of the other side would have been of assistance, too. Or are we to
assume that the Commission always follows the advice of the
Secretary, thereby fettering its discretion altogether?
(ii) Friedman J also considered whether Mr Roberts's rights had
been affected. Citing Pearlberg v Varty [19721 2 All ER 6 (HL),
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Friedman J held that the 'decision of the Commission in terms of
s 7(2) is not a final determination of the rights of the parties' (at
494C). To cite Pearlberg v Varty is a little strange when a page later
(at 495C-E) the learned judge refused to 'analyse' three other
foreign decisions (R v Venables, ex parteJones (1970) 15 DLR (3d)
355; Re Hogan and Director of Pollution Control (1972) 24 DLR (3d)
363; and Wiseman v Borneman [1971] AC 297 (HL), [1969] 3 All ER
275) on the ground that these cases involved legislation not related
to transport legislation (495E). Pearlberg, too, did not involve
transport legislation. In fact, the circumstances of that case were
barely analogous. What was involved was the decision of a
commissioner of taxes to permit the raising of assessments in
respect of arrear taxes, without observing the principles of natural
justice, where the taxpayer had failed to submit tax returns. This is
a good deal different from the case where proceedings are taking
place (albeit in a contentious manner) before one tribunal and a
directive is issued which has the effect of removing them from that
tribunal to a different one altogether. Ironically, their lordships in
the Pearlberg case were themselves prepared to make extensive use
of Wiseman (see [1972] 2 All ER at 9, 10-11, 15, 16, 17, 19-20).
It is a pity that Friedman J chose not to consider Wiseman v
Borneman, for it is a leading case in English law and in it he might
have noted with pride, as a South African, that one of England's
most brilliant judges in recent times, Lord Wilberforce, derived
assistance from, inter alia, South African cases which were cited at
the bar ([1971] AC at 317H, 318F). He would also have noted that
Lord Wilberforce based his decision on broad grounds of principle
(see the AC report at 317C) and, in particular, that the learned law
lord began his judgment with the words:
'... I cannot accept that there is a difference in principle, as to the obervance of
the requirements of natural justice, between final decisions, and those which are
not final, for example, decisions that as to some matter there is a prima facie case
for taking action' (at 317C).

What both Wiseman and Pearlbergaffirm is not that the principles of
natural justice do not apply where rights are not finally being
determined, but that they apply with varying force depending upon
the circumstances (see, for example, Pearlberg [1972] 2 All ER at
16d-e (Viscount Dilhorne) and 17g (Lord Pearson); Wiseman [19711
AC at 308B (Lord Reid), 309A-B (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest),
311E-G (Lord Guest), 314-15 (Lord Donovan) and 318A-C (Lord
Wilberforce).
Probably anticipating that the court would raise the point that the
decision to issue the directive was not a final determination of
rights in respect of the application for increased tariffs, Mr
Roberts's counsel argued that the right involved was analogous to
the rights enjoyed by parties to litigation when the court makes
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interlocutory decisions. (See the report at 494D.) The rights affected
were twofold: on the one hand, objectors lost their right of appeal to
the Commission in terms of s 8 of the Road Transportation Act;
and on the other, there was no guarantee that arrangements
concerning the subpoena of witnesses agreed upon between Mr
Roberts's attorneys and the ad hoc Board would be acceptable to the
Commission, which would now be hearing the matter. Friedman J
dismissed the latter point by saying that it had 'no merit
whatsoever', because Mr Roberts could not argue simultaneously
that the ad hoc Board had no jurisdiction whilst claiming that
arrangements entered into with the ad hoc Board constituted rights
(at 494F). But what if the objection to jurisdiction had been
successful? Surely Mr Roberts had rights in the arrangements, even
if these may subsequently have proved to be unnecessary. Does the
mere objection to jurisdiction necessarily entail the automatic
forfeiture of all other rights that would otherwise have been
enjoyed by the objector?
Friedman J spent more time dealing with the former point (at
494F-G). However, he dismissed it by holding that s 8 merely
gives a right of appeal when a local board has made a decision.
Here the local board had not made a decision and hence there was
no right of appeal (at 494H). One could reply to this that Mr
Roberts was not demanding an appeal; he was merely requesting
that he be allowed to put his case before the Commission exercised
its powers under s 7(2). To meet this, Friedman J ruled that the
decision of the Commission was an 'administrative one': 'the fact
that such a directive has consequences for interested parties does not
make its decision any less administrative' (at 495A). This, of
course, begs the very question his lordship was busy answering!
For as long as the proceedings were taking place at the local level,
s 8 of the Road Transportation Act conferred upon Mr Roberts a
right of appeal when the decision was eventually reached. The
Commission has the power to remove that right before it can be
exercised. That no one can gainsay. But that does not automatically
imply that it can do so without observing the principles of natural
justice.
To conclude, even on the test adopted by South African courts it
is respectfully submitted that Mr Roberts had a right to a hearing
before the Commission issued its directive.
2 The Commission should, in any event, have observed 'basic fairness'
(495H). I have argued elsewhere ((1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 625ff) that,
in order to obviate the difficulties attached to the classification of
functions and the connotations of rigidity sometimes borne by the
principles of natural justice, our courts should follow the lead of the
English courts by introducing the simple doctrine of fairness. Has
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the administrative tribunal or body acted fairly? For at bottom
fairness is what the principles of natural justice are all about. Thus it
was particularly pleasing to observe that Friedman J appeared to
accept, in Roberts (2), that the Commission did have a general duty
to act fairly (at 496C). Unfortunately, his lordship did not elaborate
upon the meaning of this duty, but concentrated on the specific
examples which counsel for Mr Roberts had suggested illustrated
unfairness. These were (a) the denial of an opportunity to be heard,
both in respect of the issue of the directive (at 495H) and in the
Commission's 'riding roughshod' over Mr Roberts's right to
review the decision reached by the ad hoc Board concerning its
jurisdiction (at 496B); and (b) that the Commission was prejudiced
,or was at least influenced by the one-sided representations to which
it had lent an ear' (at 495H) or that even if this were not the case,
'justice was not seen to be done and fairminded people viewing the
transaction would have believed and suspected that the
Commission might not have resolved the question before it with a
fair and unprejudiced mind' (at 496A)-in other words, bias or the
appearance of bias.
With regard to (a), in view of his lordship's previous findings
concerning the right to a hearing, that particular aspect of the
alleged duty to act fairly fell away, including the 'right' to review
of the ad hoc Board's decision, since the object of such a review
would be to stop the ad hoc Board from hearing the matter and this
was the very effect of the directive (at 496H). And so far as the
allegation of bias was concerned, his lordship found on the facts
that the Commission had not been influenced:
'In the circumstances applicant had not established, on a balance of
probabilities, that the Commission heard third respondent or that it acted or was
influenced by the alleged one-sided representations. As to whether justice was
seen to have been done, even assuming that the views of the chairman were
known to the meeting, there is nothing to indicate that the members were
unduly or improperly influenced thereby or that they did not consider the
decision on the merits as they saw them' (at 496D-E).

Thus one must accept the learned judge's conclusion on the facts,
but, with respect, it is difficult to accept that, although there was
no actual bias, there was no appearance of bias. The very fact that
only the bus company's representatives had spoken to the Secretary
for Transport and that his memorandum had been considered by
the Commission to the exclusion of all other evidence (499G)
would, to my mind, raise a prima facie inference of prejudice. And
it is only the appearance (reasonable apprehension) that is necessary
(see, for example, Jacob v Tugela and Mapumulo Rural Licensing
Board 1964 (1) SA 45 (D) at 46-7). The famous statement of Lord
Hewart CJ in R v Sussex justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
at 259 that 'justice should not only be done, but should manifestly
and undoubtedly be seen to be done' is also a principle of our law
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(see, for example, Slade v PretoriaRent Board 1943 TPD 246 at 252
and Smith v Ring van Keetmanshoop van die Nederduitse Gereformeerde
Kerk, Suidwes-Afrika 1971 (3) SA 353 (SWA) at 362F). While there
is much more to this test, including two streams of thought (see the
Smith case at 361ff and S v Radebe 1973 (1) SA 796 (A) at 811-12), it
need not be examined in greater depth for present purposes.
3 The Commission did not meet in public. Mr Roberts's counsel
relied on a Canadian case, R v Tarnopolsky, ex parte Bell (1970) 11
DLR (3d) 658 (Ont CA), for the proposition that, as a general rule,
a statutory tribunal should conduct its proceedings in public 'unless
there be good reason to hold them in camera' (per Laskin JA at 666
of the Tarnopolsky report). It is also the general rule applicable to
those administrative tribunals in England that are governed by the
English Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1958 (see H W R Wade
Administrative Law 4 ed (1977) 768). As J F Garner (Administrative
Law 5 ed (1979) 238) puts it, 'the parties concerned will not have as
much confidence in the impartiality of the proceedings if they
know that the Press and the public have no right to find out what is
going on'.
There seems to be no authority in this respect in South African
law. Friedman J held that the Commission need not have met in
public on 24 October, as it was dealing with 'purely administrative
matters. When the Commission meets to discuss matters of this
kind it cannot be described as "conducting proceedings" as it
would be if it were adjudicating upon an application' (at 501F-G).
However, in the light of the aforegoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that the matter in question was not 'purely
administrative' and that the same principle of publicity should be
applied by our courts with regard to the proceedings of all
administrative tribunals except where special circumstances require
otherwise.
II

NaturalJustice and the Duty to Act Fairly
In conclusion, I wish to return to a point raised earlier and in
more detail in my 'Fairness and Natural Justice in English and
South African Law' (1979) 96 SALJ 607 at 625ff. There I argued
that because of the difficulties associated with the principles of
natural justice, in particular with regard to the practice of
classification of functions and the distinction between rights and
privileges, as well as the tendency of the courts to apply the
principles in an all-or-nothing fashion (cf Edwin Cameron in (1980)
97 SALJ 189 at 194), it would be preferable to adopt the doctrine of
fairness which has been developed in the English courts. Roberts (2)
seems to be the first South African case in which the duty to actfairly
has been afforded some direct judicial recognition. This is especially
encouraging for two reasons. First, it has been tried and tested for
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some years now in England and has at last gained explicit
recognition in the House of Lords recently in Bushell v Secretary of
State for the Environment [1980] 2 All ER 608 (HL) at 612-13, 614,
622j and 631g-h. Secondly, it was by means of the duty to act fairly
that Canadian courts extricated themselves from the selfsame
predicament in which our courts find themselves. Until recently,
Canadian courts adopted the extreme formal approach to the duty
to act judicially that had already been rejected in 1963 by Ridge v
Baldwin [1964] AC 40 (HL) in England. (See especially Howarth v
National Parole Board (1975) 50 DLR (3d) 349 (CSC) and Desjardins
v Bouchard (1977) 71 DLR (3d) 491 (Fed Ct).) The doctrine of
fairness was suggested as a solution by the Ontario High Court in
Ex parte Beauchamp [1970] 3 OR 607 and by the Alberta Supreme
Court in R v Industrial Coal and Minerals Ltd [1977] 4 WWR 35; Re
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees and Alberta Classification Appeal
Board (1978) 81 DLR (3d) 184 and McWhirter v Governors of the
University of Alberta (No 2) (1978) 80 DLR (3d) 609. In 1978 it was
finally adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Re Nicholson and
Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police (1979)
88 DLR (3d) 671 (CSC), where Laskin CJC, delivering the
judgment in which the majority concurred, accepted that even
where there is no duty to act judicially the administration
nevertheless has a duty to act fairly (see (1979) 88 DLR (3d) at
680-2). Thus in this case a policeman whose post had not been
confirmed and who had been dismissed was held entitled to have
put his case to the respondent Board after being told why his
services were no longer required, even though he was not formally
entitled to the protection of the principles of natural justice. This was
justified on the basis of fairness alone (at 682-3 of the report) and
on the obvious rationale that the Board 'would wish to be certain
that it had not made a mistake in some fact or circumstance which
it deemed relevant to its determination' (at 682).
Re Nicholson promises to become for Canada what Ridge (which
also concerned the dismissal of a policeman) was for England: a
watershed in administrative law. It has subsequently been followed
by a flood of decisions in the state courts (of which the judge in Re
Steinman Transportation Ltd and Ontario Highway Transport Board
(1981) 113 DLR (3d) 336 (Ont Div Ct) seems unaware), indicating
'that the law in Canada in this respect is now closer to the law in
England and elsewhere in the Commonwealth' (Calhane v A-G of
British Columbia and Harrison (1980) 108 DLR (3d) 648 (Brit Col
CA) at 665), although the meaning of the fairness doctrine seems
on occasion to have been misunderstood (see, for example, Re
Provincial Agricultural Land Commission and Pickell (1980) 109 DLR
(3d) 465 (Brit Col SC) at 470ff). The doctrine seems now to be
firmly established in Canada. (For extensive analyses, see R A
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Macdonald
'Judicial Review
and Procedural
Fairness in
Administrative Law I' (1980) 25 McGill LJ 520, 'II' (1980) 26 McGill
LJ 1; andJ H Grey 'The Duty to Act Fairly After Nicholson' (1980) 25
McGill LJ 598.)
Because of the similarity in approach of our courts to that of the
pre-Re Nicholson judgments in Canada, it is my submission that we
should take careful note of what has happened there. The duty to act
fairly may not yet be crystal clear, but it does seem to be a significant
advance. Not only has it been accepted in England and Canada, it has
also been accepted by the Australian High Court in Salemi v Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 51 ALJR 538 at 542, and by
the Privy Council for New Zealand in Furnell v Whangarei High
Schools Board [1973] AC 660 (PC). This approach may well have
helped Mr Roberts in Roberts (2): all that he wanted was an
opportunity to put his case to the Commission. This does not
required formalized procedures or, indeed, any significant
adminstrative inconvenience. For while it must be conceded that the
duty to act fairly may well require something less than that required
by the principles of natural justice-and there is a danger that a
hostile court may take such an opportunity to whittle away these
procedural rights altogether (it must be conceded that Cinnamond v
British Airports Authority [19801 2 All ER 368 (CA) comes pretty close
to doing this: cf I R Ward in (1981) 44 Modern LR 103)-it must at
the same time be appreciated that attempts fully to judicialize
procedural protections, such as the duty to act fairly and natural
justice, will inevitably be counter-productive. Fairness provides the
most convenient means of facilitating flexibility without losing
procedural rights altogether. (Cf M Elliott 'Appeals, Principles and
Pragmatism in Natural Justice' (1980) 43 Modern LR 66.)
L G

BAXTER

CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT

Decisions concerning the application of customary law in the
Supreme Court have been infrequent of late. With respect, Masenya
v Seleka Tribal Authority and another 1981 (1) SA 522 (T), which is
such a decision, gives rise to a number of difficulties.
The term 'customary law' is used in this note with the meaning
given in the present writer's The Customary Law of Immovable
Property and of Succession 2 ed (1976) 7-8, that is, it refers to what used
to be called Native or Bantu or African law. Statutes now refer to
Black law. (The present writer's book is referred to hereinafter as
Customary Law.)
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